error. Fumbling around with some gadgets is of no avail; rather, systematic observation, methodical experimentation, and painstaking analysis constitute the pivot of technology development [1, I. §110, §117, §129].
However, the emerging science of the 17th century completely failed to live up to these ambitions. The declarations of practical relevance were in no way borne out by the rise of applied research. Quite the contrary. The traditional rift between science and technology remained unbridged for centuries. Christopher Wren was both an outstanding architect and a physicist. In particular, he was familiar with the recently discovered Newtonian mechanics which he thought disclosed the blueprint of the universe. However, when he constructed St. Paul's Cathedral in London, Wren exclusively relied on medieval craft rules. The Newtonian laws accounted for the course of celestial bodies and resolved the mystery of the tides, but they offered no help for mastering the challenges of architecture. Likewise, the steam engine was developed in an endless series of trial and error without assistance from scientific theory [3, p. 162-163] . The operation of the engine was understood only decades after the construction had been completed. The grasp of theory only rarely extended to machines and devices.
Around the middle of the 19th century things began to change. Applied science came into being and successfully connected theory and technology. Tinkering and handicraft were gradually replaced by scientific training. Industrial research emerged and scientists and engineers became the key figures in promoting technological progress. Around 1900, Bacon's vision of a science-based technology had finally become reality.
Bacon's conception of the relation between scientific knowledge and technological power is sometimes called the cascade model. The idea is that scientific knowledge flows downward to the material world, as it were, and becomes manifest in useful devices. Practical tasks are best solved by bringing fundamental insights to bear. Deliberate intervention in the course of nature demands uncovering nature's machinery, it requires studying the system of rods, gears, and cogwheels nature employs for the production of the phenomena [1, I. §3, I. §110, I. §117, I. §129].
I wish to explore the relationship between pure and applied research. I will begin by outlining consequences of the cascade model and will sketch an alternative, emergentist conception. Both approaches agree in suggesting that the concentration on practical problems which is characteristic of large parts of present-day research is detrimental to the epistemic aspirations of science. These concerns are not without justification. Yet examining Albert Einstein's road toward special relativity theory brings an additional message in its train: Taking practical issues into account may stimulate epistemic progress. I will explain that the operational notion of simultaneity that constituted a key element in the conception of special relativity was suggested by the technological background of the period. Technology became heuristically fruitful for scientific theory. My conclusion is that pure science has less to fear from application pressure than is thought in some quarters.
Contrasting Intuitions on the Cascade Model
The growth of scientific knowledge leads to the increasing capacity to cope with intricate circumstances and heavily intertwined causal factors, and this improvement also enhances the practical relevance of scientific theory. As a result, the cascade model appears to provide an adequate portrait of the relationship between scientific progress and technology development. In fact, the cascade model was underlined in the so-called Bush-report issued in 1945 [4] . Vannevar Bush had been asked by President Roosevelt to devise an institutional scheme that would make science in the future post-war period most beneficial to the people. The President was interested in how to improve the usefulness of science; he explicitly mentioned the fighting of diseases and the stimulation of economic growth. In his report, Bush placed fundamental research at center stage. As he argued, new products and new jobs can only be created through continuing basic research. Bush gave two reasons. First, the solution of a practical problem may come about as an unexpected consequence of a seemingly remote theoretical principle. Second, innovative approaches to practical problems often originate from an unfamiliar combination of such principles. Both arguments imply that the theoretical resources needed for meeting a technological challenge often cannot be anticipated and specified in advance. As Bush claimed, practical success will frequently result from fundamental insights in fields and subjects apparently unrelated to the problem at hand. The lesson is clear. The royal road to practically successful science is the broad development of basic research. If useful knowledge is to be gained, it is counterproductive to focus on the concrete issues in question. Rather, forgetting about practical ends and doing fundamental research in the entire scientific field is the first step toward practical accomplishments. In the second step, technologically relevant consequences are drawn from these principles; that is, theoretical models for new technical devices and procedures are derived [4] .
The message of the Bush report strongly influenced the public understanding of the relationship between basic and applied research. Indeed, there was and still is an element of truth in it. A large number of the technological innovations in the past decades were achieved by bringing theoretical understanding to bear on practical challenges. For instance, the breathtaking decrease in the size of electronic circuits was accomplished by procedures which draw heavily on theories of optics and solid state physics. Similarly, inventions like optical switches or blue light emitting diodes are produced by joining and combining hitherto unconnected laws of physics. Conversely, what amounts to the same, premature applications may come to grief. A case in point is the striking failure of the American systematic program on fighting cancer. This program was launched in 1971 after the model of the Manhattan Project and the Apollo Program; it included a detailed sequence of research steps to be taken in order to advance cancer prevention and therapy. The practical achievements reached were almost insignificant, and this failure is usually attributed to the fact that the fundamental knowledge necessary for developing successful medical treatment was still lacking [5, p. 211-212 ].
The cascade model has proved its relevance for relativity theory, too. Einstein's fundamental insights into the factors influencing temporal durations figure prominently in the satellite-based global positioning system (GPS). Numerous satellites in the orbit of the earth broadcast signals from which a terrestrial receiver can infer the time at which the signals were sent. By taking into account the velocity of light, the distance to the relevant satellites can be obtained. It is clear that such a procedure is critically dependent on highly accurate clocks in the satellites. At this juncture, distortions highlighted by special and general relativity come into play. Time dilation slows the orbiting clocks down, the weaker gravitational field makes them run faster. Consequently, the clocks need to be manufactured in such a way that they run inaccurately on Earth -and even substantially inaccurate at that. As a matter of fact, in 1977 when the first cesium clock was launched into the orbit, some engineers doubted the appropriateness of such comparatively huge alterations and insisted that the clocks run at their uncorrected terrestrial rate. A relativistic correction mechanism was built in but remained switched off initially. The signals received exhibited precisely the distortion predicted by the joint relativity theories. After 20 days of increasing error, the correction unit was activated -and has remained so ever since [6, p. 285-289] .
Thus, relativity theory is attuned to Bush's leitmotif that theoretical principles may gain unexpected practical significance or, conversely speaking, that the solution to practical problems may come from remote theoretical quarters. You never know for sure in advance which particular corner the light of knowledge will illuminate. Yet, on the whole, the picture is not that clear. Other indications point in the opposite direction. Let me contrast the cascade model with contrary considerations.
Underlying the cascade model is a thorough theoretical optimism. Insights into nature's mode of operation extend to include the subtleties of the functioning of engines and gadgets. Theoretical principles are able to capture the fine details of the phenomena on which the appropriateness and reliability of some artifact turns. Within the sciences, such a sanguine attitude is called reductionism. No feature of nature is small enough or remote enough to escape the grip of the fundamental laws. However, scientists do not embrace reductionism univocally. Rather, its prospects remain contentious. In the U.S. debate around 1990 about the usefulness of building a superconducting collider on Texan soil, one of the warring factions, the particle physicists prominently among them, maintained that unveiling the fundamental processes would shed light on phenomena at higher levels of the organization of matter. That is, discoveries in particle physics should help to clarify properties and interactions at the nuclear, atomic or molecular scale. By contrast, the opposing anti-reductionist or emergentist camp featured the specific character of the phenomena at each level of organization. Emergentists deny that insights about quarks or strings will radiate downward, as it were, and have much impact on the clarification of phenomena from atomic or solid state physics.
Actually, these two factions go back to a venerable opposition in the philosophy of nature, the opposition, namely, between Platonism and Aristotelianism. Platonism is committed to the rule of fundamental law; the universal is supposed to pervade the whole of nature. Aristotelianism insists on the basic and unique character of specific cases; the differences among the particulars outweigh their shared features. This latter view has been prominently supported in the last quarter century by Nancy Cartwright. As she argues, the universal claims of overarching laws are specious; such laws fail to gain access to the phenomena with their rich details and variegated traits. Cartwright takes up an example of Otto Neurath who had drawn attention to the embarrassing silence that seizes Newtonian mechanics in the face of the question where a thousand-shilling bill swept away by the wind in Vienna's St. Stephen's square will hit the ground eventually [7, p. 318] . The only way to get a grip on the phenomena is by making use of local models that are tightly locked onto particular problems. Descriptive adequacy is only accomplished by small-scale accounts; comprehensive theories inevitably lose touch with the wealth of the phenomena. The patchwork quilt, not the pyramid, is symbolic of the structure of scientific knowledge [7, p. 322-323] .
Such Aristotelian or emergentist approaches are tied up with a new account of the relation between basic and applied science or epistemic and practical research. The cascade model is abandoned; basic research is said to be largely unsuccessful in meeting applied challenges. Rather, practical problems are to be attacked directly; a detour through the basics is unnecessary and superfluous. Fundamental truths only rarely produce technological spin-offs. Applied research needs to rely on its own forces. The heuristic message of emergentism is that the resources available for addressing practical challenges should be allotted to doing research on precisely these practical challenges.
In fact, a closer inspection of the present state of applied research confirms this latter approach. Industrial companies tend to reduce basic research in favor of target-oriented projects which aim at concrete, marketable goods. Take "giant magnetoresistance" as an example. The underlying physical effect was discovered in 1988; it involves huge ("giant") changes of the electrical resistance of systems composed of thin ferromagnetic layers separated by non-ferromagnetic conducting spacer layers. The resistance of such systems is strongly dependent on the direction of magnetization of the ferromagnetic layers which can be altered by applying an external magnetic field. As a result, the electrical resistance of such an array is influenced by an external field, and this dependence can be used to build extremely sensitive magnetic field sensors. Giant magnetoresistance underlies the functioning of today's magnetic read heads; it is used for hard disks or magnetic tapes. It was realized immediately that the effect is based on spin-dependent scattering of electrons, but such a qualitative explanation was insufficient for constructing suitable devices. For technological use, quantitative relations between relevant parameters such as layer thickness or ferromagnetic coupling between layers were needed. Such relations were not provided by theory, but had to be gained experimentally. When it came to building working devices, the empirical identification of design rules, not the appeal to fundamental laws, were the order of the day [8] .
However, if focusing on narrow, practical issues determines the agenda of applied research, and if fitting parameters is among its chief tools, what kind of science will we end up with? Given the dominance of application-oriented research, its methods and procedures can be expected to radiate into the whole of science. Actually, worries about the detrimental impact of applied research on the methodological dignity of science have been articulated frequently. For instance, theoretical physicist John Ziman complained recently that science guided by material interests and commercial goals will lack objectivity and universality ( [9, p. 399]; see [8, Sect. 1] ). In the same vein, particle physicist Silvan Schweber claimed that "the demand for relevance ... can easily become a source of corruption of the scientific process" [10, p. 40] . According to such voices, science is likely to suffer in methodological respect from the emphasis on practical use. Application dominance jeopardizes the demanding epistemic standards that used to distinguish science; conversely, retaining such standards requires a commitment to truth rather than utility.
These considerations leave us with a stark alternative concerning the structure of applied research. If the cascade model is correct, concentration on practical issues will dry up practical success in the long run. It would mean eating up the seed corn needed for producing future harvest. If the emergentist approach is correct, practical success is best accomplished by focusing on specific issues, but proceeding in this fashion could spoil the epistemic merits of science. Which side is right? Well, it helps to cast a glance at Einstein who worked at the Bern patent office while pondering the electrodynamics of moving bodies.
Poincaré, Einstein, Distant Simultaneity, and the Synchronization of Clocks
It is well known that Einstein in his classical 1905 paper on special relativity suggested two principles as the foundation of the theory he was about to develop. First, the principle of relativity according to which all frames of reference in uniform-rectilinear motion are equivalent, not alone with respect to the laws of mechanics but also regarding electrodynamics including optics [11, pp. 26,29] . Second, the statement that the velocity of light is independent of the motion of the light source. This claim was not peculiar to Einstein but rather a theorem of classical electrodynamics, or the "Maxwell-Lorentz theory."
This latter theory implied, however, that the velocity of light should depend on the motion of the observer. In a series of experiments, conducted in part with Edward Morley, Albert Michelson had established that no such dependence was measurable. Surprisingly enough, the velocity of light came out the same for differently moved observers. Yet the assumed variation in the velocity of light was the chief means for determining the state of motion of an observer. Thus it appeared that different frames of uniform-rectilinear motion or inertial motion could not be distinguished empirically. This failure posed a serious challenge to electrodynamics to which Hendrik Lorentz responded by developing a more sophisticated version of the theory.
The appropriate application of the principles of electrodynamics (such as Maxwell's equations) demanded that the relevant values of "true motion" or motion with respect to the ether be known. True motion should become manifest in a change in the measured speed of light depending on the velocity of the observer. However, the Michelson-Morley experiment showed that no influence of the motion of the observer on electromagnetic quantities could be recognized. Lorentz pursued a two-pronged strategy for coping with this anomaly. First, he introduced a quantity he called "local time" which differs from place to place and is thus distinguished from true, universal time t. Local time t is obtained from true time t, the velocity v and the position x of the observer, and the velocity of light: t = t − vx/c 2 . Lorentz's proposal was to employ local time for ascertaining the electromagnetic properties of moved bodies. Namely, these properties are determined by calculating them for bodies at rest in the ether at the corresponding local time. In other words, the effect of the motion was taken into account by evaluating the relevant quantities at a time different from the true one. Lorentz considered position-dependent local time as a mathematical artifact for transforming electromagnetic quantities and did not expect that local time showed up on anybody's watch. Second, Lorentz introduced a contraction hypothesis according to which bodies were assumed to shrink as a result of their motion through the ether. This length reduction was thought to be produced by the interaction between moved matter and the ether. The resting ether compresses the body in passage through it, and this contraction precisely cancels the effect of the motion on the velocity of light. The change in the velocity of light induced by the motion is precisely compensated -as the Michelson-Morley null result demands. No effect of the motion on the moved body will be registered ( [12, Lorentz provided his contraction hypothesis with a theoretical backing. He assumed that the forces of cohesion that produce the shape and dimensions of a body are electromagnetic in kind (or at least transform like electromagnetic forces) and was able to derive the contraction hypothesis on this basis. The stated conclusion was that "many" phenomena appear in the same way irrespective of the observer's state of motion, which means that Lorentz did not rule out the existence of tangible effects of the motion of bodies through the ether. That is, his improved theoretical framework did not embody a principle of relativity 1 . From 1900 onward, Henri Poincaré modified Lorentz's approach in two important respects. First, Poincaré had suggested in 1898 that temporal notions like duration or simultaneity are not given by the senses but need to be defined. Defining simultaneity is, as he went on to argue, a matter of coordinating distant 
Both assumptions are also characteristic of special relativity theory. Einstein supposed as well that local time is the time provided by a moved clock and is thus given in experience, and he also stated that only relative motions are accessible empirically. Yet this superficial agreement hides a deep-seated divergence as to the nature of local time and the conceptual status of the relativity principle. For Poincaré, local time involved a distortion of true time that was due to the motion through the ether. In reality, the velocity of light is different depending on the motion of the observer; the true value is only assumed in the system at rest in the ether. As a result, the correct simultaneity relations are only obtained within this rest system. However, there is no way to know which system is really at rest. Signal synchrony yields mistaken simultaneity relations for systems in true motion but since all clocks are distorted alike and length relations altered correspondingly, the true simultaneity relations cannot be revealed by experience. The simultaneity relations and the yardstick used for their evaluation change in the same way so that the true relations remain hidden. Consequently, for Poincaré, the principle of relativity constituted a theorem of electrodynamics. It was deduced from electrodynamic assumptions, procedures for establishing simultaneity relations, and the forces acting on charged bodies. In addition, the principle was purely epistemic. In nature, there are privileged frames of reference and absolute motions; yet they are concealed from the unbefitting curiosity of human observers ([23, pp. 188-189]; [14, p. 10]).
Einstein dissented on both counts. First, he placed the relativity principle at the top. After a quick reference to the failed attempts to identify states of absolute rest, he immediately jumped to the principle: "We will raise this conjecture (whose intent will from now on be referred to as the 'Principle of Relativity') to the status of a postulate" [11, p. 26] . In contradistinction to Lorentz and Poincaré, the principle was not supposed to be derived but stated as a premise. Second, Einstein did not confine the principle to observable phenomena but extended it to the theoretical description. This is apparent from the famous opening paragraph of the 1905 paper in which Einstein criticizes an explanatory asymmetry inherent in the then-current electrodynamics: the interaction between a magnet and a coil is treated differently depending on which object is assumed to be in motion. If a coil is moved in a static magnetic field, an electric current is produced through the Lorentz force; if the magnet is moved, the current is generated by induction. The value of the current agrees in both cases, but its emergence is attributed to different causes. Einstein took this conceptual asymmetry to be utterly implausible. In his view, there was but one phenomenon, namely, coil and magnet in relative motion; and one phenomenon demanded one explanation. Consequently, Einstein was not content with the recognition that the attribution of specific states of motion made no observable difference; he required in addition that the theoretical explanation invoked nothing but relative motion.
However, this creative shift was not enough to save the situation but rather gave rise to a great puzzle. The principle of relativity implies that observers in different states of motion measure the same value of the velocity of light. Yet how is it possible, one must ask, that this quantity comes out the same without appeal to any compensating mechanism? Einstein masters this challenge with another creative shift, namely, the adoption of a procedural definition of simultaneity. From Poincaré, Einstein had learned that judgments about simultaneity are to be based on procedures for synchronizing distant clocks. Einstein elaborated this operational approach to simultaneity and proposed to employ light flashes as a means for synchronizing distant clocks. Two distant clocks are said to be synchronous if the transit time of the signal from the one to the other, as given by reading both clocks, equals the transit time in the backward direction. This is tantamount to saying that the two clocks are synchronous if the reflection of the signal at the distant clock, as measured by that clock, is one half of the period which passes between emission and return of the signal, as measured by the clock at the origin ( [11, p. 28] ; [24, pp. 196-197] ).
Einstein went on to demonstrate that the Lorentz-contraction can be explained on this basis. Observers in relative motion who apply this rule will deviate in their judgments about which events are simultaneous. Measuring the length of a moved body involves locating its edges at the same time. Divergent assessments of the prevailing temporal relations will obviously affect the outcome of length measurements. Lorentz-contraction ceases to be a dynamic effect, based on the action of the forces of cohesion, it becomes a metrogenic effect, based on different judgments about simultaneity. Some argumentative steps later Einstein also succeeded in resolving the conceptual asymmetry in electrodynamics that had prompted his initial worries. Special relativity was born.
Einstein's operational approach to simultaneity was the key to success. However, adopting such an approach is by no means a matter of course. On the contrary, placing all one's bets on signal synchrony seems highly dubious in the face of the counterintuitive results this method yields. Imagine the situation: A criterion for assessing simultaneity relations picks different events as simultaneous according to the state of motion of those who bring the criterion to bear. Simultaneity ceases to be objective and becomes a frame-dependent notion. How to digest such a finding? One might be tempted to argue that the relativity of simultaneity militates against the procedural approach to simultaneity and suggest that the latter be abandoned. Yet Einstein sticked to it -in spite of its seemingly absurd consequences. And the scientific community quickly accepted this move. But why? What is the reason for Einstein's confidence in the operational notion of simultaneity? And why was the scientific community prepared to follow him on this path?
The Emerging Rule of Global Time
The procedural approach to simultaneity was first proposed by Poincaré who recommended the telegraph as a preferred means for synchronizing distant clocks. Yet Poincaré advanced his suggestion not as something new and innovative but as "the definition implicitly admitted by the scientists" [21, p. 11] . Peter Galison recently elucidated the vast technological background to this judgment. Standardizing time readings by coordinating distant clocks constituted one of the chief items on the agenda of technology development in the three decades preceding Einstein's wrestling with the issue. One of the reasons was the rapid expansion of the railroad system. Traditionally, the clocks were set on a local or regional basis by using astronomical procedures. That is, clocks were adjusted to the corresponding mean solar time. The spread of a train service operating on a fixed schedule demanded the coordination or unification of the scattered local time zones.
In addition, an early wave of globalization swept through the late 19th century world. Soaring trade and commerce figures and the foundation of colonies worldwide created a demand for unambiguous time regulations and accurate maps. The problem with drawing global maps lay with measuring longitude differences reliably. In general terms, it was clear how to proceed. The time readings of clocks placed at the relevant positions had to be compared and the local deviations be translated into shifts in the east-west direction. However, a comparison of this sort requires that the clocks run in a coordinated fashion. Accordingly, establishing distant synchrony was not a remote subtlety but rather pervaded the web of commerce, technology, and politics of the period.
In fact, the procedure standardly adopted for synchronizing clocks was sending signals. Around 1880, a pneumatic system was in use in Paris. Air pressure pulses raced through pipes underneath the streets and transmitted time signals to public clocks distributed over the city. The delay due to the transit time of the pressure waves ran up to 15 seconds and was corrected by an array of mechanical counteracting devices [6, pp. 93-95] .
From the 1880s onward, this clumsy network of pipes war replaced by a system of cables and wires. The signals employed for synchronizing clocks became electrical; the telegraph made its appearance. Electrocoordinated time connected Europe with North America and with the colonies overseas. The subsequent technological step was taken in the early 20th century. It involved employing radio waves and allowed surveyors to dispense with a costly network of cables across land and sea. Time coordination and longitude determination became feasible worldwide. Distant synchrony was achieved by emitting a radio signal at a known time and adjusting a distant clock accordingly, taking due account of the transit time. Longitude differences were determined on that basis by using two clocks and sending one radio signal from east to west and another one from west to east [6, pp. 184-186] .
In the period under consideration, Poincaré served as chief of the French Bureau de Longitude and was familiar with the practical challenges of coordinating clocks; he referred to the crosswise exchange of signals, i.e., the method in practical use in the administration he headed [14, p. 7] . Likewise, this array of two clocks connected by two signals sent back and forth strikingly resembles the arrangement Einstein invoked for the operational introduction of simultaneity. The only difference is that he referred to light rays whereas electrical signals and radio waves were in general use in his period [11, p. 28] . Likewise, Einstein's passing reference to train schedules as a means for illustrating the importance of simultaneity [11, p. 27] gains a significance that is easily missed otherwise. The technical background makes its presence felt strongly.
It is worth remembering, therefore, that Einstein lived in Bern which, by 1905, ran an extensive network of coordinated clocks, see Fig. 1 . It is worth noting, too, that Einstein worked as a technical expert in the Swiss patent office. He reviewed and examined patent applications, and clock making was one of the key technologies of the period. A number of applications concerning electrically coordinated clocks passed through the patent office between 1902 and 1905, some of which must have crossed Einstein's desk [6, p. 248] . It is true, Einstein was critical of Newtonian absolute time and similar metaphysical conceptions as a result of his philosophical studies. Reading the works of Hume, Mill, Mach, and Poincaré had prepared him to accept procedural notions of temporal quantities. Yet the adoption of signal synchrony as the basis of distant simultaneity is no doubt strongly influenced by the technology of his time and his daily work in the patent office. Next to Einstein, the philosopher-scientist, stands Einstein, the patent officer-scientist [6, p. 255] . It is at this juncture where we find the sought-for basis of Einstein's seemingly premature confidence in the operational definition of simultaneity. Here lies the justification for retaining signal synchrony despite its prima-facie implausible ramifications and to transform our spatiotemporal notions on that basis.
Technology-Based Concepts and the Rise of Operationalism
The upshot is that the technological development of the period contributed to shaping concepts used in highbrow theory. The procedural approach to simultaneity paved the way toward the understanding of the electrodynamics of moving bodies. The underlying operational attitude is found in both Poincaré and Einstein, but Einstein pushed this approach much further than Poincaré and thereby prepared the breakthrough to Special Relativity. Poincaré continued to adhere to a privileged, true simultaneity relation. It is true, he emphasized the epistemic problems involved in the identification of true simultaneity. At bottom, Poincaré developed an epistemic circularity argument to the effect that the quantity to be evaluated and the standard used for the evaluation change in the same way so that no observable effect remains. In reality, the velocity of light is influenced by the absolute motion of the observer; but, first, as a result of using signal synchrony and, correspondingly, judging simultaneity relations in terms of local time, and, second, due to the universal contraction of bodies moved through the ether, this influence is invisible in the data.
This means that Poincaré did retain the notion of a preferred frame of reference. The ether rest frame was distinguished among the class of inertial frames in that it alone yields the true measures of lengths, velocities, and electromagnetic quantities. The motion through the ether produces a distortion of these magnitudes which is compensated by other effects of the motion. Poincaré's account, like Lorentz's, involves a sort of conspiracy among different effects brought forth by the motion of bodies. These effects are so contrived as to cancel each other out, hiding in this way the true quantities.
It is characteristic of Poincaré that epistemic problems of this sort did not, in his view, undermine the legitimacy of the concepts involved. The notion of simultaneity remains unaffected. Events happening at the same true time are truly simultaneous -whatever their relation at the local time scale is. Local time is a specious measure of temporal relations; it is flawed by the inability to take absolute motion into account. Likewise, the principle of relativity was confined to the phenomenal realm. In reality, the relevant quantities are affected by the motion, but its influence is compensated by counteracting factors with the result that no net effect remains. Consequently, the principle of relativity merely expresses operational limitations but does not extend to the nature of the concepts involved.
By contrast, Einstein understood the principle of relativity in a stronger, more literal sense. The results obtained by differently moved observers are objectively equivalent, not merely indistinguishable in their appropriateness. There is no true, universal measure of the relevant quantities; rather, electromagnetic fields and spatiotemporal relations are really different in different frames of reference. In Einstein's approach, distant simultaneity is a relational notion in that it is only defined with respect to a frame of reference. Frame dependence (or "relativity") is part of the concept of simultaneity, it is not merely an obstacle to the appropriate application of the concept. Einstein's insistence on the operational foundation of scientifically adequate concepts was accepted as a model by empiricist positions to the philosophy of science. Moritz Schlick, Hans Reichenbach, or Percy Bridgman regarded Einstein's emphasis on the definitional and procedural aspects of concept formation as a major breakthrough in epistemology.
The idea to elucidate the semantic features of a concept by drawing on the characteristics of the pertinent measurement procedures comes out particularly clear in the claim of the conventionality of simultaneity. This claim originated with Poincaré [21, p. 13] , was accepted by Einstein [11, p. 28] and elaborated within the mentioned empiricist approaches. As the argument developed in this latter framework runs, the evaluation of one-way velocities requires distant simultaneity relations. Yet in order to single out simultaneous events, signal speed needs to be known. As a result of this reciprocal dependence, distant simultaneity cannot be based on experience alone but is (within limits) subject to a stipulation ( [25, pp. 148-149] ; [27, p. 155] ).
Underlying such commitments to operationalism is the conviction that establishing the concept of distant simultaneity requires a feasible method for comparing events in temporal respect. The crucial step is, then, that the room left by such procedures is indicative of the room inherent in the concept. On this markedly operational attitude, epistemic confines in ascertaining simultaneity relations are tantamount to the objective indeterminateness of these relations. It is precisely this attitude that made Einstein accept the counterintuitive, framedependent judgments about simultaneity relations as an adequate aspect of the concept of simultaneity.
In sum, Poincaré took the first step and advocated a procedural approach toward the notion of simultaneity, Einstein went one step further and advanced a procedural notion of simultaneity. Viewed along such lines, the ramifications of introducing a worldwide web of electrocoordinated clocks reached far up into the lofty realms of theoretical physics and philosophy of science.
Technological Problems, Technological Solutions, and Scientific Progress
The incipient career of special relativity theory places the fruitful interaction of technology and physics in the lime light. The early development of Einstein's thought shows that technology can be heuristically fruitful; it can promote scientific understanding. This finding does not square well with either one of the before-mentioned accounts of the relationship between pure and applied research. Neither the cascade model nor the emergentist conception left room for a seminal or productive influence of technology on science. The conclusion to be drawn from the case study is that technological challenges need not have a deteriorating effect on science. It may happen that technology stimulates scientific inventiveness.
At first sight, this account does not precisely respond to the concern raised earlier. Einstein had a scientific problem which he solved by developing a technology-based solution. The predicament addressed before was that focusing on technological problems might bring scientific progress to a halt. The worry mentioned in Sect. 2 was that concentrating research on technological issues could exhaust the epistemic resources of science and eventually block any further advancement of scientific understanding. However, the story of how special relativity was conceived can be reframed in such a way that concerns of this sort are mitigated. After all, the technological problems of establishing simultaneity that plagued railroad planners, cartographers, and other practical professions stimulated Poincaré and Einstein to revise the conception of simultaneity. As a result of application pressure, they conceived of simultaneity as a definition and suggested an operational approach. At second glance, therefore, the account is able to alleviate apprehensions as to the harmful impact of applied research on epistemic science.
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In other cases the pressure of practical problems on theory development is even more pronounced. Not infrequently, practical challenges cannot appropriately be met without treating problems in basic science. This feature I call application innovation. It involves the emergence of theoretically significant novelties within the framework of use-oriented research projects. Although theoretical understanding is not among the objectives of applied research, it may yet be produced in the course of solving practical problems. On some occasions, treating such problems successfully demands addressing epistemically significant issues. Once in a while, applied research naturally grows into basic science and cannot help generating epistemic insights.
High-temperature superconductivity is a case in point. The phenomenon was discovered in 1986 in the IBM research laboratory near Zurich, and its identification stimulated the development of new theoretical accounts of superconductivity. Similarly, the transistor effect was found in the Bell laboratories. The emergence of this effect was based on the truly innovative procedure of adding impurities to semiconductors which act as electron donors or acceptors. This idea enriched solid state physics tremendously. Turning to biology, the pathbreaking polymerase chain reaction was first conceived in a biotechnology firm, and the revolutionary conception of prions was elaborated in the practical context of identifying infectious agents. Prions are infectious proteins which reproduce without the assistance of nucleic acids; they were discovered during a use-oriented study on the sheep disease scrapie.
In these examples, research had been directed toward a practical goal but unintentionally produced innovations in basic research. This is no accident. Applied research tends to transcend applied questions for methodological reasons. A lack of deeper understanding of a phenomenon eventually impairs the prospects of its technological use. Superficial empirical relations, bereft of theoretical understanding, tend to collapse if additional factors intrude. Uncovering the relevant mechanisms and embedding them in a theoretical framework is of some use typically for ascertaining or improving the applicability of a finding. Scientific understanding makes generalizations robust in the sense that the limits of validity can be anticipated or, as the case may be, expanded. Treating applied questions appropriately requires not treating them exclusively as applied questions. This is why epistemic science has less to fear from application pressure than it might appear initially.
The cascade model applies in a number of cases, and the emergentist approach rightly characterizes others. Yet application innovation represents a third mode of research which teaches a methodological lesson different from the others and tends to vindicate applied research in methodological respect.
The electrodynamics of moving bodies headed the research agenda of the period. Einstein approached this familiar problem situation in an unfamiliar way, namely, by starting from a procedural notion of simultaneity. This notion itself was by no means novel; it emerged tied up with the progress of clock technology and lay open right in front of Einstein's eyes at his desk at the patent office. The innovative step Einstein took was to connect topical areas and to bring the practice of railroad planners and surveyors to bear on issues of highbrow physical theory. This is quite typical of human creativity. On rare occasions only do we succeed in conceiving ideas completely novel and without precedent. Much more often innovations are produced by the more modest procedure of bringing together what appeared separate before. The Copernican achievement is precisely of this sort. Copernicus intended to solve the problem of the apparent inequality of planetary motions, as many had attempted before him, and he did so by drawing on the heliocentric ordering of the planetary orbits that was bequeathed to him by astronomical tradition. Both elements were widely known. Yet no one had endeavored before to invoke the heliocentric configuration as a means for resolving the inequality problem. Unifying seemingly disparate features is the predominant mode of producing innovations. And this is precisely the mechanism underlying Einstein's originality. He linked the technology of clock coordination to the issue of how bodies move when they approach the velocity of light. Links of this sort are the stuff human originality is made of.
